The recent circumnavigation of Australia by People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) warships suggests the PLAN is getting closer to operationalizing theater-level concepts such as blocking key archipelagic maritime chokepoints and disrupting U.S. and allied force flow and sustainment in the South Pacific, part of the PLAN desire to defeat the U.S. Navy in a potential future “high end naval war.”
In a sign of increasing confidence in the PLAN’s ability to operate beyond the second island chain, a PLAN Task Group completed a circumnavigation of Australia during February and March. The deployment included a live-fire exercise in the Tasman Sea roughly halfway between Australia and New Zealand. The activity was noteworthy not just for the circumnavigation of Australia (a first for the PLAN) but also for the inclusion of the Type-055 cruiser in a far seas deployment and for the concurrent maritime training activity in the East and South China Seas.
The PLAN established its “Zhanlan” (湛蓝, meaning “deep blue”) far seas training series of exercises in 2016 as an annual event. As CASI analyst Roderick Lee noted in 2020, while live-fire and combat training often creates the most attention during these types of PLA training activities, the critical outcome from Zhanlan is the training focus on combat support.
There was no public reporting of the PLA’s annual Zhanlan series of far seas training exercises after 2021. However, far seas training events over the Spring Festival (Lunar New Year) period have continued every year since then with a similar task group composition, deployment distance, and stated training emphasis.
It is probable the southern PLAN deployment close to Australia and New Zealand was at least part of this year’s iteration of Zhanlan.
If that is the case, the southern far seas deployment – and similar concurrent activities in the South China Sea and Yellow Sea – reflects the evolution of PLAN training exercises. This event should therefore not be considered unique or a specific “provocation,” but rather a marker on the PLAN’s trajectory toward being able to challenge the U.S. Navy’s dominance in the Pacific. It is likely that similar deployments and exercise patterns will become an annual occurrence in the southern Pacific. Regional governments should prepare for this new reality.
Overview of Training Activity
The high intensity of PLAN South China Sea training and deployments suggests the main indicator of departure from “baseline” training is activity outside the second island chain.
As in previous years, there was no official announcement of a specific training serial or focus period related to Zhanlan or other far seas exercises. The PLAN appears to combine multiple training serials into a single at-sea deployment; public statements reveal that crew can spend up to 200 days at sea when aboard major fleet units. These serials can include a range of activities such as high-intensity combat simulation, replenishment at sea practice and group “formation training.”
The southern far seas exercise appears to have started around February 3. On February 13, three PLAN vessels joined up in the Coral Sea to Australia’s northeast after passing through the Sulu Sea. The task group transited Australia’s east coast, close to Australia’s largest city, Sydney, on February 19 before conducting “live fire drills” in the Tasman Sea on February 21 and 22.
Referred to as “Task Group 107” by the Australian Department of Defense, the deployment consisted of the Renhai-class (Type 055A) cruiser Zunyi (DDG-107); the Jiangkai II-class (Type 054A) guided missile frigate Hengyang (FFG-568); and the Fuchi-class support ship Weishan Hu (AOR-887).
The live-fire activity appears to have been against simulated air and surface targets and occurred roughly halfway between Australia and New Zealand. While the live fire took place in international waters, it aroused significant interest and controversy, as the PLAN did not establish a closure area for air traffic and did not provide notification of an intent to conduct live-fire drills.
Limited public statements on the exercise claimed the training focus was on combat coordination and readiness. The deployment occurred at the same time as other Type 055 training in the Yellow Sea and South China Sea. The exercise appears to have ended around March 7, with DDG-107 and AOR-887 together transiting the Sunda Strait on March 9.
Similarities With Previous PLAN Far Seas Training
Despite the lack of public statements from the PLAN on the purpose and timing of the deployment, there are parallels with previous Zhanlan activities. This suggests that the deployment was planned as part of PLAN ongoing operational preparedness and not as a politically significant “message” to the Australian government.
First, the timing of the exercise aligns with previous Zhanlan/far seas training activities running over the Spring Festival period in mid-February. Second, the exercise ran for 35 days (based on the time the three ships remained in formation) and covered approximately 9,500 nm, both in line with observed Zhanlan exercises between 2016 and 2021. Third, the live-fire area in the Tasman Sea is almost the exact same distance from Southern Theater Command Headquarters in Guangzhou as the position west of Oahu where Hawai‘i comes within the range of the PLAN’s anti-ship and anti-air missiles (approximately 300 nm). This is similar to previous Zhanlan activities that occurred at equidistant ranges to Hawai‘i.
There was no reference to “joint training” this year. Given the sensitivity of deploying vessels so close to Australia – a major U.S. ally – it can be assumed that significant national-level support from the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLA SSF) was provided at Theater Command level. It is possible the deployment also exercised PLA theater-level assets and coordination at Southern Theater Command headquarters in Guangzhou.
Previous iterations of Zhanlan included a “high value unit” such as an amphibious transport dock and an intelligence collection vessel in the task group. These vessels were likely not included this year either to reduce the risk and complexity of the deployment, or to test the capacity of the Type 055 to receive and transmit intelligence and targeting information back to Southern Theater Command HQ.
One of the PLAN’s stated aims for the Type 055 is for the vessel to act as a command hub, either directly supporting carrier operations or as a separate task group coordinating strike operations. An exercise outcome may have been to test a task group’s offensive capabilities without dedicated intelligence collection vessels, including determining the limits of space-based intelligence support. This is a more realistic wartime deployment for an offensive strike task force, as an intelligence collection vessel would not be sent into a high-risk combat zone.
Concurrency
The noteworthy trend observed in this year’s deployment was the conduct of concurrent training operations. As noted above, at the same time the Type 055 Zunyi was sailing along Australia’s east coast there were separate training activities in the South China Sea (Southern Theater Command) and Yellow Sea (Northern Theater Command), both centered on the Type 055.
The South China Sea training focused on combat support; the PLAN would expect to hold the South China Sea as a defensive block for the PLA’s southern flank during a Taiwan Strait contingency. The Yellow Sea activity included live-fire activity and “nuclear defense,” which may be code for ballistic missile defense. The Type 055 has been identified as a platform for ballistic missile mid-course intercept capabilities.
While concurrent naval exercises were noted in late 2020, this year is the first time three concurrent activities centered on the Type 055 occurred and is the first time a distant seas operation occurred as part of a concurrent activity.
Rehearsals for Future Carrier Deployment?
The PLAN demonstrated its acceptance of true “blue water operations” (outside safe aircraft divert range) in late 2022 when the Type 002 carrier Liaoning conducted training in the Philippine Sea. The PLAN Type 003 carrier Fujian recently completed sea trials and the Type 055 is designed and built to escort and protect PLAN carriers. Was this southern task force preparing Southern Theater Command for carrier deployments outside the second island chain?
This seems highly unlikely given the complexity and risk of long-range carrier operations. While the PLAN has grown extremely quickly and is showing increasing competence in integrated strike operations, the type of long-range carrier operations conducted by the U.S. Navy are still potentially up to a decade away. The PLAN is yet to deploy carrier-borne surveillance aircraft, launch (and recover) aircraft carrying air-to-surface weapons, and generate a deck cycle of more than 10 aircraft. While carrier deployments outside the second island chain are to be expected by the 2030s, in the short term PLAN aircraft carriers should be considered supporting assets for ship-based offensive strike within the first island chain.
With the possibility of a “second batch” of Type 055 (potentially the Type 055B) already under construction, future PLAN strike task forces outside the second island chain will likely be based on teamed carrier group-destroyer strike and air defense ships, with multiple frigates conducting anti-surface warfare and anti-ship missile defense for the combat support ship. This aligns with publicly available statements on PLA operational design such as sea mobile operations.
The Concept of “Maritime Mobile Operations”
The PLA National Defense University’s 2020 edition of Science of Military Strategy expanded previous concepts of PLAN deep operations and maneuver operations to the requirement for “maritime mobile operations,” with the purpose to “seize control of important sea areas or control of important strait passages, improve the situation of naval battlefields, or create favorable conditions for other strategic operations.”
Describing the features of these operations, the publication noted that “the dependence on strategic support is large”; that “the relatively short time of engagement has high requirements for command and decision-making”; and that these operations are “far away from the homeland and… difficult to support.”
A recent RAND study observed that while the PLAN has made impressive progress at the tactical level in adapting Communist Party strategy to local circumstances, overall the PLAN struggles to operate with the level of operational flexibility that a theater-level conflict would require, particularly if constant and reliable communication with decision-makers on mainland China is disrupted or denied.
Based on the limited public information available and making assumptions based on previous observations of Zhanlan exercises, the southern far seas deployment conducted training in four of seven “integrating factors” noted by the RAND study as essential for sea control and deep strike: advanced fleet exercises (concurrency), advanced damage control and anti-air warfare, underway replenishment, and advanced intelligence. This suggests that with the technology mostly in place, the PLAN continues to develop its integrative capacity from “naval strike” to “limited sea control and deep strike” towards the final goal of sea control.
Conclusion
Initial press reporting and commentary regarding the southern far seas deployment argued that the PLA – or more specifically, the Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party – was using it to send a “message” to the Australian population about the Australian Defense Force and other militaries conducting “freedom of navigation” flights and ship transits close to the Chinese mainland. Providing an example to audiences in Asia of PLAN power-projection capability was no doubt one benefit of the deployment. However, the southern deployment should be seen in the context of incremental and important PLAN development in its ability to conduct offensive operations outside the second island chain.
PLA planners know the Pentagon would use the Australian mainland as a secure rear area for logistics support to forward-deployed INDOPACOM forces during a contingency or conflict. They also understand the Australian mainland will serve as a springboard for Pacific Air Forces to create a second maritime front and flow significant strike assets from the south during a Taiwan Strait confrontation, as well as closing the links in the island chain at the Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok Straits.
For Asian military planners, the recent southern far seas deployment suggests the PLAN intends to gain the initiative in any future conflict by taking control of key maritime terrain and conducting deep-strike mobile maritime operations outside the second island chain.
